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ABSTRACT 
 
Left for Dead: Tactical Safe Spaces and Rogue Chinese Archives on the Gaming Platform 
Steam 
 
by 
 
Patrick D. Fryberger 
 
 In this paper, I consider how Chinese gamers modify both ideologies and 
technologies on the gaming platform Steam. Working from Mayfair Yang’s notion of 
“socialist space” and Lefebvre’s “representational spaces,” I argue that these gamers seek to 
transform their representational spaces into reality by “modding” the content and code of 
computer games and archiving roguish discourses on the tactical safe space of the Steam 
Workshop. Because of these modders’ paratextual activity, a China-specific version of the 
Steam client will be released in the near future, thus censoring Steam as is in mainland 
China. To better understand this “China Steam” swap and the relationship between modding 
and censorship, I employ a diachronic approach, examining historical precedents of other 
“propaganda archives” in both premodern and modern eras. Moreover, I engage with fan 
fiction studies to further conceptualize modding and censorship, fusing de Certeau’s 
“strategies and tactics” with Abigail De Kosnik’s “rogue archives” and thus putting forth the 
framework of a tactical safe space. After laying out this approach, I share the process and 
findings of my “guerilla netnography” of Chinese modders on the Left for Dead 2 (L4D2) 
  vi 
Workshop, detailing three categories of mods and their associated paratexts. Finally, I turn to 
Steven J. Jackson and Cuban thinkers and scholars to show how modding is a part of a larger 
sociopolitical narrative of repair and inventiveness in post-socialist contexts such as the PRC, 
in which modders turn the socialist ideology of the state upon itself. 
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 1 
Introduction: A Cat-and-Mouse Game on Steam 
 Both in the media and academia, online censorship in China has often been portrayed 
as a game of cat-and-mouse.1 While some have attempted to challenge this notion, it remains 
an extraordinarily potent image for engaging with these issues, recalling the classic American 
cartoon Tom and Jerry which also remains popular in China today.2 In such an analogy, there 
is an implicit understanding that the mouse ultimately cannot prevail; it may run and hide, 
but the cat, however bumbling in its efforts, maintains its superiority in size, speed, force, as 
well as in its hunting ability and resourcefulness. In short, the strategy of the cat is to 
eliminate the spaces where the mouse can flee to, while the tactic of the mouse is to 
simultaneously delay the cat in these aims and wait for a prime opportunity to escape.3 As I 
will repeatedly attempt to do in this paper, I hope to make a slightly more nuanced historical 
analogy—ironically to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself, which during the 
Republican era was involved in a kind of cat-and-mouse game with the Nationalists (KMT), 
being chased on a 5600-mile “Long March” (長征) across the country to the city of Yan’an 
in Shaanxi Province between 1934 and 1935. Where this analogy differs from the cat-and-
mouse one above is that the Communists effectively made their semi-permanent base at 
Yan’an—not simply hiding away or regrouping, but expanding—building up not only a pool 
of flesh-and-blood troops, but also an archive of ideology to draw on and fight with in what 
was a genuinely momentous struggle. In the modern “Chinese civil war” of censorship, there 
are many tactical bases like Yan’an sprawled across the internet, especially outside of the so-
called “Great Firewall of China” (GFW; 防火长城). As will be explained below, the GFW 
often works both ways, keeping domestic users in and foreign users out (much like how 
Yan’an was shielded by its relatively remote location in the northwest). Unlike Yan’an, 
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however, these online tactical bases have traditionally remained outside of the jurisdiction of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC), existing instead on the less-clear-cut but ever-
increasingly-policed frontier of cyberspace. As a result, dozens of foreign media platforms 
have simply been blocked and replaced with domestic alternatives. Yet in recent years, the 
CCP authorities and private-sector censorship apparatuses under their influence have 
developed new and creative strategies to combat the proliferation of these tactical safe 
spaces: namely, procuring the direct cooperation or even appropriation of foreign media 
sites, the most recent example of which is the gaming platform Steam. 
 As can be perceived from the analogies above, this encounter between the “cat” of the 
CCP authorities and the “mouse” of those who are critical of them is essentially one 
involving space, or rather a “spatial struggle.” In her article of the same name, Mayfair Yang 
examines these “microstruggles over space” between the secular PRC state and some of its 
more spiritually-minded citizens in rural Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province during the 1990s, 
focusing specifically on the preservation, demolition, and (re)construction of temples, 
shrines, churches, ancestor halls, and other ritualistic sites. Working from the spatial theories 
of French thinkers like Michel de Certeau, Henri Lefebvre, and Michel Foucault, Yang 
develops her own notion of a “socialist space” impinging on local cultural and religious 
practices,4 which in themselves can be understood as an incarnation of Lefebvre’s 
“representational spaces…embodying complex symbolisms, sometimes coded, sometimes 
not, linked to the clandestine or underground side of social life.”5 Yang further quotes 
Lefebvre at length in order to illustrate the significance of representational spaces for 
underrepresented groups: 
 
 
 3 
Groups [or] classes…cannot constitute themselves, or recognize one another, as 
“subjects” unless they generate (or produce) a space. Ideas, representations or values 
which do not succeed in making their mark on space, and thus generating…an 
appropriate morphology, will lose all pith and become mere signs… [W]hatever is 
not invested in an appropriated space is stranded, and all that remain are useless signs 
and significations. Space’s investment—the production of space—has nothing 
incidental about it: it is a matter of life and death.6 
 
Some twenty-five years later, the “post-socialist space” of the CCP is still making its 
presence known on a different kind of space, or cyberspace, and the Chinese government’s 
chronic preoccupation with such Foucauldian concerns as “state security and surveillance 
through spatial arrangements”7 is thus reenacted online. Although perhaps not as dramatic as 
the KMT army bearing down on the CCP during the 1930s, the PRC government employs 
the Great Firewall in a distinctive blend of fear, friction, and flooding8: the GFW represents 
ideology backed up by force on the one hand,9 and propaganda backed up by censorship on 
the other. Much like how some scholars have argued that the building of the (actual) Great 
Wall was in effect an offensive maneuver,10 the GFW has steadily evolved from a seemingly 
defensive technology to an offensive juggernaut aimed at bending the World Wide Web to its 
will. This is perhaps why the activity of modding, or modifying the content and code of 
computer and video games, is perceived by the PRC authorities as particularly dangerous, 
especially when combined with “rogue” ideologies critical of the Party-nation-state. And this 
is one of the reasons why the CCP has begun to co-op platforms such as Steam, where both 
technology and ideologies are modded at will. 
Steam is an internationally-popular gaming platform developed by the Valve 
Corporation. Released to the public in 2003, the Steam client operates first and foremost as 
an online shopping portal, storage cloud, and server-provider for users’ computer games, and 
secondarily as a social network and fan community. Given its near-monopolization of the 
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digital distribution market,11 Steam has unsurprisingly been the first foreign platform to make 
inroads in mainland China, reaching some thirty million Chinese users as of 2018;12 in fact, 
at the time of writing more than half of the users currently on the platform have selected 
“simplified Chinese” as their default language.13 This growing majority of users from China 
has been xenophobically interpreted by some non-Chinese users as an “invasion,”14 with 
allegations of cheating,15 review bombing,16 and other gaming-related behaviors perceived as 
negative, and this invasion has not gone unnoticed by the Chinese government, either: in 
recent years, Steam has seen some of its major features blocked in the country, most notably 
the Steam Community and other related functions (e.g. the activity feed, forums, and Steam 
Workshop) which were given the axe in 2017.17 This process has continued with the blocking 
of individual games18 and entire genres19 from the Steam Store, and as of 2018, Valve has 
announced that a China-specific version of the client will be released in collaboration with 
Perfect World, a Chinese game developer which manages local operations of popular Valve 
titles like DOTA 2 and Counter-Strike: Global Offensive (CS: GO).20 These developments 
reflect the CCP’s long-standing concerns with maintaining social stability (维稳) and 
political control on the one hand, and economic protectionism on the other, recalling 
previous arrangements with foreign media companies such as Microsoft agreeing to release a 
Chinese “TOMS” Skype21 or Apple forfeiting control of its iCloud servers for mainland users 
to Guizhou-Cloud Big Data (GCBD).22 And these developments equally threaten the viability 
of Chinese Steam users to post and participate in modding and fandom communities on what 
might be called the “tactical safe space” of the Steam Workshop. 
In this paper, I argue that Chinese gamers seek to transform their representational 
spaces into reality by “modding” both ideologies and technologies and archiving roguish 
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discourses on the tactical safe space of the Steam Workshop. To make the case for this, I will 
first provide a working definition of modding as well as a broad overview of the corporately-
appropriated modding community of the Workshop. Next, I consider the issue of censorship, 
employing a diachronic approach in examining the imperial collection the Siku quanshu四庫
全書 (The Complete Library of the Four Treasuries) and the Qianlong literary inquisition (乾
隆文字獄) of the early Qing Dynasty (1772-1793). I take this historical detour to illustrate 
how the “China Steam” swap functions as a propaganda archive in conjunction with the 
censorship practices (fear, friction, and flooding) of the Great Firewall, much like how the 
inquisition worked hand-in-hand with the compilation project of the Siku. Third, I engage 
with fan fiction studies to further conceptualize modding through the theoretical lens of 
French thinkers Gérard Genette and Michel de Certeau, fusing de Certeau’s “strategies and 
tactics” with Abigail De Kosnik’s “rogue archives” and thus putting forth the framework of a 
tactical safe space. After laying out this theoretical approach, I share the process and findings 
of what might be called my “guerilla netnography” of Chinese modders on the Left for Dead 
2 (L4D2) Workshop, detailing three categories of mods and their associated discursive modes 
of discourse competition, pop activism, and culture jamming. Finally, I turn to Steven J. 
Jackson and Cuban thinkers and scholars to show how modding is a part of a larger 
sociopolitical narrative of repair and inventiveness in post-socialist contexts such as the PRC, 
in which modders turn the socialist ideology of the state upon itself. But first, just what is 
modding? What is the Steam Workshop? How can we understand the significance of 
modding in both Chinese and foreign contexts? These questions and more are addressed in 
the following sections. 
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“Playbouring” in the Sandbox: Mods and the Steam Workshop 
Modifications, mods, or add-ons (模组) are alterations made to the content or code of 
a computer or video game by “modders” who are generally unaffiliated with its official 
development. In Players Unleashed! Modding The Sims and the Culture of Gaming, Tanja 
Sihvonen defines modding as “the activity of creating and adding of custom-created content, 
mods, short for modifications, by players to existing (commercial) computer games.”23 Some 
mods represent simple aesthetic changes, such as new “skins” for avatars or weapons, while 
others take the form of “total conversions,”24 and yet other mods aim to “reduce player effort, 
make visible invisible parts of the game, enable information sharing, aid players in 
coordinating with one another, and capture aspects of play history.”25 Dan Pinchbeck, in his 
monograph on the classic first-person shooter (FPS) DOOM, discusses modding at length: 
Modding is creating new variations on a game by using a combination of new assets, 
new level designs, and alterations to the game’s codebase. Mods can be freely 
distributed and shared, with developers and publishers understanding that these 
communities and experiences add significant value and shelf life to their products, 
introduce new users to their games, uncover new talent, and break new ground in 
terms of experimentation and optimization.26 
 
This understanding between the official and unofficial, between the “authorized” and the 
“rogue,” where developers, publishers, and distributors turn a blind eye toward modding 
communities and the revisions they make to games, is crucial to understanding the dynamic 
of modding as a whole. Unlike authorized modifications—originally known as expansion 
packs and now as downloadable content (DLC) or patches—mods have predominantly 
existed outside of this official realm, spreading instead on the “rogue archives” of fan sites 
and forums. Julian Kücklich has described this dynamic and the work of modders as 
“playbour,” a loose umbrella term encompassing everything from “modding’s uncertain 
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status in respect to traditional notions of work and leisure, the deprivation of modders of their 
intellectual property rights, the game industry’s outsourcing of risk to the modding 
community and the ideological masking of modding as a collaborative process.”27 Similar to 
Pinchbeck’s points above, Kücklich further outlines five benefits that mods and modding 
communities provide the gaming industry, or that 1) mods can help establish a brand, 2) 
mods add to the shelf-life of a product, 3) mods increase customer loyalty, 4) modding is an 
important source of innovation in the industry, and 5) the modding community is also used as 
a recruiting pool for the industry. Taken together, Kücklich examines the relationship 
between modders and the gaming industry from a political economy perspective, or as one of 
“dispersed multitude” up against exploitative capitalist controllers, respectively—a dynamic 
which is naturally rife with uncertainties and the potential for conflict. Consequently or 
perhaps in despite of this dynamic, the modding world has from time to time encountered 
pronounced legal resistance from corporate gaming interests,28 a fate analogous to its cultural 
counterpart fan fiction, which will be discussed later in this paper. Furthermore, in recent 
years modding communities have been increasingly co-opted by these corporate interests, 
most conspicuously by Valve, which in 2012 introduced the Steam Workshop, a modding 
community and archive built directly into the infrastructure of the Steam platform itself. 
Founded in 1996 by former Microsoft employees Gabe Newell and Mike Harrington, Valve 
was and still remains a company largely built on modding—the studio’s first flagship title, 
Half-Life, was legally designed on top of the Quake engine (conceived by rival developer id 
Software), while their second major title, Counter-Strike, was adapted from a mod of Half-
Life itself.29 Unsurprisingly, Valve has continued this trend with other titles such as Team 
Fortress, Day of Defeat (DoD), Garry’s Mod, Alien Swarm, DOTA 2, and Black Mesa, 
 
 
 8 
appropriating mods as commercial products, putting modders on the payroll, and ultimately 
annexing entire modding communities into the Steam Workshop.  
Originally a rather narrow feature showcasing monetized, user-made content for 
Valve’s AAA title Team Fortress 2 (TF2),30 the Steam Workshop has since exploded into a 
free and relatively open archive encompassing a vast swathe of games and their associated 
user-created mods. Game developers can decide for themselves whether or not to institute 
Workshop compatibility and are also able to set the technical parameters of what kinds of 
mods can be uploaded.31 Some titles take a “sandbox” approach,32 facilitating a large degree 
of flexibility and variability with regard to modding opportunities, while others are more 
limited in scope, such as the “curated” TF2 Workshop where users’ mods can be officially 
incorporated into the game. After some intense initial controversy, monetized and curated 
Workshops have largely fallen out of favor,33 and at the time of writing, most of the several 
million mods produced for the 1000 or so games on the Workshop are user-created and 
generally unaffiliated with official development. The Workshop page of a compatible game 
can be accessed either on the Steam Community—a social network-like hub which also 
includes a news feed, forum discussions, screenshots and fan artwork, walkthroughs and 
strategy guides, live stream broadcasts and other related videos, as well as user reviews of the 
game—or directly through a user’s Steam Library, which stores a list of the user’s games 
both in the Steam cloud and locally on his or her computer. The interface of the Workshop 
provides a convenient searchable database of mods organized by tags (representing different 
categories of game content—characters, campaigns, maps, weapons, items, sounds, scripts, 
the UI, and so on) as well as by catch-all categories such as “Most Popular,” “Most 
Subscribed,” and “Most Recent” (figure 1.1.). Through this interface, Steam users are free to 
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upload their own mods as well as download and “subscribe” to other users’ mods, thereby 
incorporating them into their own games. The page of a given mod features 1) the mod’s 
title, author, and file size, 2) the date when it was uploaded as well as subsequent “change 
notes” (modifications made to the mod itself), 3) a description with screenshots and/or 
videos, 4) a rating system (both five-star and thumbs up/thumbs down) including button 
options to “share,” “favorite,” and “report,” 5) page statistics (“unique visitors,” “current 
subscribers,” and “current favorites”), and 6) a comment section and even a discussion forum 
(figure 1.2). This highly sophisticated interface builds upon the diverse and innovative 
designs predicated by fan sites and modding communities which were once peppered across 
the internet during the 1990s and 2000s. The difference now, of course, is in the 
centralization of the archive and its appropriation by corporate interests and gaming 
developers, further regulated by the technical parameters they establish. Technical or code 
constraints aside, the content of mods in the Workshop is at best intermittently policed, and 
through its moderators Valve permits a black mass of copyrighted, violent, and borderline-
 
Figure 1.1. An example Steam Workshop page for Valve’s Left for Dead 2 (L4D2). Left: the top half 
of the interface; right: the bottom half of the interface. Screenshots taken March 2019. 
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Figure 1.2. An example mod page from the L4D2 Workshop. Top: the mod’s title, avatar, and sample images; 
left: the author and mod description; right: the comment section (in Chinese). Screenshots taken March 2019. 
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pornographic material to be shared over the platform in the form of mods. Moreover, the 
Workshop is not region-specific; in the comment sections inlaid below mods, one can often 
find users communicating in a wide variety of languages including Chinese, English, 
Russian, Spanish, German, Portuguese, and French, but with China’s planned ban and 
eventual replacement of the platform, users of its most common language will inevitably be 
walled off from this cosmopolitan “public sphere”34 and the kinds of sociopolitical discourses 
it produces. 
Although the Workshop and the Steam client’s communal functions have been 
blocked in mainland China, mainland users still utilize Virtual Private Networks (VPN) and 
other “wall-crossing” (翻墙, alluding to the GFW) software to post mods and indeed 
participate in the Steam Community. Of particular interest for this paper is the politically-
charged or “roguish” nature of some of these mods and their associated paratexts as produced 
by Chinese Steam users and shared across the Workshop. Ranging from overtly-nationalist 
material (the Chinese flag, People’s Liberation Army, and other spectacular cultural 
symbols), to banned memes (former PRC President Jiang Zemin, known colloquially as “The 
Elder”), and other politically or socially sensitive topics (Taiwan), Chinese users on both 
sides of the political spectrum, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and indeed on both sides of 
the world have been “making do” with what I might be called a tactical safe space for free 
and open sociopolitical discourse in the Steam Workshop. Unlike other major online 
platforms (including, at the time of writing: Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Whatsapp, Reddit, 
and Amazon in the US, or QQ, Sina Weibo, bilibili, WeChat, Zhihu, and Taobao in China), 
Steam’s controversial and relatively laissez-faire content policy35 allows users to post 
“everything…except for things that [Steam moderators] decide are illegal, or straight up 
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trolling.”36 And while some Steam users may lament the corporate appropriation of modding 
communities by Valve, for mainland Chinese users, who have for years had to continuously 
develop and reinvent complex, coded language and word games37 and other related “tactics” 
under the heavy censorship of Chinese social networks, the Workshop provides not only a 
liberating, even democratizing space where different political discourses can be engaged with 
via self-generated mods and their paratexts, but also a rogue archive for these practices to be 
documented, celebrated, and further developed even as they are simultaneously censored, 
deleted, and relentlessly suppressed behind the Great Firewall. And as Valve follows in the 
footsteps of Microsoft and Apple and submits to the Chinese government’s demands, the 
very existence of this tactical safe space is now in jeopardy, so I hope that this paper, too, 
may serve as an archive for these mods and their associated discourses to be preserved. 
Before detailing my semi-ethnographic research on how Chinese Steam users make 
do with Workshop as a tactical safe space and rogue archive, I will first look at how the 
activity of modding is integrally related to not only censorship, but also the notion of a 
propaganda archive in a Chinese historical context. Subsequently, I will turn to what Megan 
Condis has called modding’s “analog cousin”38 or fan fiction, and its associated scholarship 
of fandom studies to establish a theoretical framework going forward. 
 
Modding, Censorship, and Propaganda Archives: The Siku quanshu and the Qianlong 
Literary Inquisition 
 As indicated above, modding, or modifying the content and code of computer and 
video games, has been understood as a relatively recent phenomenon, a type of “new media” 
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distinct to the digital age. However, if we extend this definition to include other, more 
traditional types of art—literature, painting, and poetry, for example—then it can be argued 
that at least in a Chinese context, some form of modding has almost always existed, and long 
before the advent of computer and video games. In The Three Perfections: Chinese Painting, 
Poetry, and Calligraphy, Michael Sullivan poses what at first seems like a simple question, 
or “what, and why, do the Chinese write on their paintings?”39 To examine this phenomenon, 
Sullivan frames it as more of a paradigm in which imperial-era literati, scholar-officials, and 
artists would see paintings “as a living body, an accretion of qualities, imaginative, literary, 
historical, personal, that grows with time, putting on an ever-richer dress of meaning, 
commentary and association with the years.”40 His analysis is richly illustrated with works 
from the Tang to Qing Dynasties and even features examples from as late as the Mao era and 
up to the present day, including several inscriptions which were added considerably later by 
someone other than the original painter. Most conspicuously, the Qianlong Emperor (r. 1735-
1796) of the early Qing was notorious for writing on or over anything and everything set 
before him—a modder and censor par excellence. Apart from Qianlong and the three 
perfections, it is also commonly accepted that the “Four Great Masterpieces” of Chinese 
literature (四大名著) were all likely edited or “modified” by several authors over the course 
of their development,41 while another classic novel, The Plum in the Golden Vase 金瓶梅, 
could even be regarded as one of the first examples of “fan fiction” given that it is essentially 
a spin-off of Water Margin—one of the four classic novels. Correspondingly, composition of 
the ci poetry of the Song Dynasty (宋词) basically amounted to reworking or adding new 
lyrics to popular songs,42 while other forms of poetry, such as “poems written on walls” (題
壁詩)43 and calligraphy written on the ground in Chinese parks, or other forms of writing, 
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such as the “big character posters” (大字报) of the Cultural Revolution and the Democracy 
Wall shortly after, all involved writing over or “modding” other works of art. Even today, on 
Chinese video sites like bilibili (哔哩哔哩, or “B站”), users’ “bullet screen” (弹幕) 
comments—or comments which scroll horizontally across the video itself—flood popular 
videos to the point where one cannot even make out the original video-images. Moreover, on 
the Steam Workshop, some Chinese modders will customize not only various elements of 
games, but also other users’ mods—borrowing them with or without credit—making slight 
alterations here and there. As I attempted briefly in the introduction, in this section I hope to 
make a nuanced historical allegory in order to better understand the processes and indeed 
historical precedents of not only modding, but also the notion of a propaganda archive, 
looking in particular at the connections between imperial-era collections and the “China 
Steam” swap. Yet aside from this loosely-defined and relatively apolitical list of examples 
above, it can be challenging to trace the history of modding given its almost dialectical 
relationship to another form of rewriting, or censorship. In other words, in order to delineate 
a history of modding, we also need to examine the history of censorship, and as two sides of 
the same coin, we can see that censorship and modding indeed develop in conjunction with 
one another, employed respectively as “strategies and tactics” in the struggle over a kind of 
greater cultural space. 
 Like modding, censorship has a strong precedent in a Chinese historical context. 
Although different incarnations of censorship and censorship practices have existed across a 
whole range of societies throughout history, the PRC’s development of such sophisticated 
and stifling apparatuses as the Great Firewall has led to its reputation as a surveillance state, 
indeed calling forth historical connections. Apart from what might be called the post-
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Tiananmen era (1989-present), several distinct periods of particularly stringent censorship 
can be identified based on current scholarship as well as archival and archaeological finds: 
 The short-lived Qin Dynasty (221-206 BCE), which implemented strict Legalist 
reforms and purportedly carried out the notorious “burning of books and burying 
alive of Confucian scholars” (焚書坑儒). 
 The reign of the first emperor of the Ming Dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang (r. 1368-1398), 
who sought to purge Mencius from the Confucian canon while also issuing 
propagandistic proclamations and carrying out a ruthless literary persecution on a 
scale not experienced since the Qin. 
 The “literary inquisition” (文字獄) of the early Qing (1772-1793), in which the 
Qianlong Emperor sought out the destruction of so-called “seditious” works while 
also overseeing the compilation of the largest collection of texts in Chinese history, or 
the Siku quanshu 四庫全書. 
 The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) of the Mao era, or a crude political maneuver 
masked as ideological purification in which the efficacy of the twin apparatuses of 
propaganda and censorship ultimately spiraled out of control. 
In Censored: Distraction and Diversion inside China’s Great Firewall, Margaret E. Roberts 
provides what is both a comprehensive and rather helpful definition of censorship for 
examining these periods, describing it as “the restriction of the public expression of or public 
access to information by authority when the information is thought to have the capacity to 
undermine the authority by making it accountable to the public.”44 Roberts further delineates 
three mechanisms of censorship which can influence both the media and individual citizens 
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alike: 1) “fear,” or threats of punishment which may deter the access or spread of 
information, 2) “friction,” or a kind of tax on information, either in time or money, such as 
the GFW, and 3) “flooding,” or information coordinated as distraction, propaganda, or 
confusion, often associated with China Central Television (CCTV) state media and wumao 
(五毛) commenters.45 Although Roberts primarily focuses on a contemporary context, these 
mechanisms are equally applicable to the historical periods listed above, providing a kind of 
theoretical conduit in which to consider them collectively. In this section, I review the Siku 
quanshu and its associated literary inquisition—which together could be said to epitomize the 
age-old mix of fear, friction, and flooding—while employing the other periods as peripheral 
examples. Looking at the Siku offers a pertinent and exceptionally rich framework for 
analyzing the relationship between modding, censorship, and the role of archives in this 
greater “spatial struggle.” In other words, before examining the “rogue archive” of the Steam 
Workshop, we first need to look at an example of its evil twin, or what might be called a 
propaganda archive, of which the Siku is a prototypical example.  
As a brief aside, some may question the place of such a discussion in a paper on 
“modern” China, much less one on computer games and mods. Apart from resisting this silly 
premodern-modern dichotomy and its associated institutionalization in the academy,46 I 
firmly believe that this kind of diachronic perspective can help make the case for a 
discernable relationship—if not direct connections—between different eras of modding and 
censorship in Chinese history, even if it is by no means a linear narrative or deterministic in 
nature. For instance, it is well known that the Qianlong Emperor praised the reign of Zhu 
Yuanzhang, while Mao Zedong just as (in)famously called for a reassessment of the ruthless 
and Machiavellian Legalist rule of the Qin. Mao himself has often been compared with Zhu 
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in terms of their shared peasant background and authoritarian style, while even today, Mao-
era personality cults and hardline propaganda have resurfaced following the rise of 
“princeling” (太子党) Party officials whose fathers once found themselves on one side or the 
other in the Cultural Revolution struggle. One prominent example of this princeling 
phenomenon would be the fall of Bo Xilai, who fell from grace in a power play after 
instituting neo-leftist “red culture” policies and Zhu-esque anti-corruption campaigns (唱红
打黑) in Chongqing, while another would be the rise of Xi Jinping himself, who is beginning 
his second (and now indefinite) term as the President of the PRC at the time of writing. In 
other words, history repeats itself through itself, and unfortunately, the Xi era appears to be 
no different, with “The National Project of Qing History” 国家清史编纂工程 (Qingshi 清
史)47 eerily and ironically echoing what might be called its predecessor project, or the Siku 
quanshu.  
 The Siku quanshu, often translated into English as The Complete Library of the Four 
Treasuries, was an imperially-sponsored collection of historical texts compiled in the early 
Qing largely on account of a 1772 edict by the Qianlong Emperor. R. Kent Guy summarily 
introduces this massive project in his seminal monograph on the subject, The Emperor’s 
Four Treasuries: Scholars and the State in the Late Ch’ien-lung Era:  
In the winter of 1772, the Ch’ien-lung Emperor initiated the compilation of the Ssu-
k’u ch’üan-shu (Complete library of the four treasuries) by ordering local and 
provincial officials to search for, report, and make copies of all rare and valuable 
manuscripts held in libraries within their jurisdictions and to forward the results to 
Peking. At the same time, he urged private collectors to send their treasures to Peking 
voluntarily. In March of 1773 an administrative apparatus was created at the capital to 
receive the books and to evaluate their contents. The staff for the project grew, finally 
encompassing over seven hundred editors, collators, and copyists, including some of 
the most important figures at court and in the literary circles of the day. The final 
products, created and corrected over a twenty-two year period, were an annotated 
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catalog of 10,680 titles extant in the empire grouped in four categories or “treasuries” 
(classics, history, philosophy and belles lettres), and an enormous compendium in 
which 3,593 titles were recopied filling 36,000 chüan. The darker side of the effort 
was a campaign of censorship undertaken by the imperial court in the late 1770s and 
early 1780s. By some counts as many as 2,400 titles were destroyed in this campaign, 
and another four or five hundred “revised” by official fiat. The products of the Ssu-
k’u ch’üan-shu project were, of course, of enormous bibliographic significance. But 
in a sense the processes of collecting, editing, and censoring were even more 
significant, for they shed light on an issue and an era.48 
 
Likewise, in a much earlier and even more ground-breaking dissertation on the 
contemporaneous “literary inquisition,” L. Carrington Goodrich contends that by the time of 
the late Qianlong reign, censorship in China had evolved into “a systematized search, 
organized on a huge scale, and linked inseparably with a process the Chinese have honored 
by frequent practice and long esteemed…the assembling of rare books and manuscripts for 
the formation of a ts’ung-shu, in this case to be the largest ever compiled.”49 Although an 
appropriate moniker, the term congshu 叢書 (alternatively translated into English as 
“collection,” “library,” or “reprint series”) does not really do the Siku justice, as the Siku 
catalogues a huge number of congshu itself.50 It would perhaps be more useful to designate 
the Siku as an archive, through which its compliers sought to “unify critical understanding 
with textual verifiability”51 on the one hand, and neutralize heterodox ideologies and “rogue 
archives” on the other. In other words, the power upholding the late Qianlong reign was 
indeed one of a “combination of anthology creation and literary inquisition,”52 resulting in a 
grandiose exercise of fear, friction, and flooding. The Siku was thus the ultimate embodiment 
of what might be called “imperial space,” a propaganda archive which repressed the 
representational spaces of its critics via the censorship of the inquisition, and a “strategy” 
which had been developed over the course of a number of dynasties and eras and through 
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which the new Manchu rulers could assert their dominance over the Han-Chinese literati and 
bureaucracy (and by extension, the Chinese realm as a whole). 
 Goodrich and others have examined in detail the horrors of the Qianlong literary 
inquisition and the fear it brought the Chinese literati and bureaucracy. Indeed, the 
inquisition embodied the censorship mechanism of “fear,” the compilation process was one 
marked by “friction,” and the finished product entailed a “flooding” of the historical record 
with the new imperial propaganda archive of the Siku quanshu. In a brutal campaign which 
has been compared to the purges and hysteria of Cultural Revolution,53 the Qianlong court 
made countless examples of officials, literati, clerks, bookstore owners, and even their family 
members via admonishment, demotion, banishment, imprisonment, and execution, resulting 
in the escalation of an empire-wide book-burning effort which soon snowballed out of 
control. As such, violence was committed against not only bodies but also cultural relics: 
words were smudged off both books and steles—pages were ripped out, shrines were 
“renovated,” and headstones were effaced (again recalling Qianlong’s predilection for 
“modding” poetry and paintings) in this all-encompassing campaign to stamp out sedition.54 
As with the Zhu Yuanzhang literary persecution some 400 years earlier,55 the inquisition put 
a chill over the bureaucracy—representing one of several factors which led late imperial-era 
literati to focus on the relatively narrow scholarly pursuit of textual research and criticism (考
證).56 At present, the administration of fear in censorship practices also comes at a cost—for 
both the censors and censored alike. As Roberts explains, fear “must be observable to work 
and the expansion of people involved in public discourse has reduced the credibility of 
government threats. Instead, potential backlash against censorship can create unrest that 
reduces the legitimacy of the regime… The government [thus] reserves more traditional fear-
 
 
 20 
based censorship strategy to target journalists, public opinion leaders, and activists.”57 As we 
will see below, Chinese modders on the Steam Workshop allude to and indeed satirize these 
strategies with comments referring to “checking the water meter,” “drinking tea,” and “firing 
squads.” And it is precisely because the mechanism of fear backfires and can only be directed 
toward a relatively small contingent of people that the CCP has been forced to rely on other 
methods, particularly friction. 
In his examination of Ming-Qing era censorship practices, Timothy Brook relates the 
anecdote of Korean envoy Pak Chi-won who, while visiting Qing China in 1780, candidly 
remarked that “instead of burying the scholars alive as the Qin dynasty did, the court buries 
them in labours of collation; and instead of burning the books as the Qin did, it scatters them 
in the Bureau of Assembled Pearls.”58 This glib anecdote reflects the transition of state 
censorship practices from fear to friction, and eventually to what would become the “flood” 
of the Siku project. Whereas in the imperial era, the mechanism of friction consisted mainly 
of clumsy maneuvers such as exiling officials and burning books, the Great Firewall is 
perhaps the ultimate embodiment of friction59: taxing information, filtering content, and 
funneling internet users onto domestic platforms and portals. Friction can also have its 
consequences, however, as an overreliance on any one strategy will inevitably draw attention 
to the censorship itself. Much like how Weibo and its users over- and self-censor to an 
almost arbitrary extent,60 loose guidelines, uncertain standards, and the absence of a formal 
definition of sedition led to an equally overzealous degree of censorship during the 
inquisition, when local officials essentially had to create “front-line operating manuals” as 
they went along.61 This ultimately forced the Qianlong court to delicately dissolve the 
inquisition effort, a miscalculation which the CCP will be unlikely to repeat: the Party has 
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been incredibly cautious and patient in censoring the Steam platform, recognizing the danger 
of stripping away a recreational outlet—a “Valve” to let off “Steam,” if you will—for 
millions of gamers across the country. Just as the court subtly imposed the friction of the 
compilation project upon the literati and bureaucracy, the CCP has steadily chipped away at 
the Steam client, levying a “tax” on the accessibility of certain games, genres, and even 
features of the platform, as noted in the introduction. Yet fear and friction often result in only 
a gap in the record, or even worse, an “ideological void.” As such, the court similarly 
recognized the dangers of simply partaking in censorship; it also realized the necessity of 
producing a propaganda archive, “flooding” the cultural space of the Qing Empire with a 
new historical record. 
Even with the prevalence of fear and friction, the Siku project operated primarily in 
the mode of flooding, serving as a propaganda archive while also working in conjunction 
with the censorship of the inquisition. As Guy suggests, by “the mid-1770s the imperial 
attention seems to have shifted from correcting extant historical texts to writing new 
histories… [I]n order for the new works on Manchu history to be believable, older ones had 
to be destroyed or discredited.”62 Speaking to the centrality of the written record in imperial 
China, Arthur F. Wright expounds on this point through his analysis of the role of 
propaganda, remarking that “the record is blank or incomplete on mass movements that were 
always knit together by heterodox ideologies and invariably presented a threat to the social 
order. The record is therefore as thin on the uses and effects of propaganda among dissidents 
as it is rich on the use of representations by the established powers.”63 In other words, 
propaganda archives have often triumphed by means of the strategy of censorship, while 
rogue archives have had to resort to the tactic of modding. Thus for the Chinese state 
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(whether imperial or otherwise), the mechanism of flooding would be ineffective without 
friction, the (re)production of a propaganda archive would be fruitless without censorship, 
and the completion of a massive collection like the Siku would be nearly impossible without 
its associated inquisition, especially for “barbarian invaders” such as the Qianlong Emperor 
and the Manchus. On the foreign space of Steam, the CCP has resorted to similar strategies to 
essentially legitimatize their rule, censoring certain features of the platform in the ultimate 
aim of swapping one archive for another. In sum, the Siku and Qianlong inquisition can serve 
as a mirror not only for the China Steam swap, but also for recent historical endeavors such 
as the National Project of Qing History, reflecting a larger trend “as old as the Chinese 
imperium itself.”64 
If the compilation of the Siku quanshu and its associated literary inquisition entailed a 
kind of strategy which swapped out one archive for another—censoring the historical record 
and inserting propaganda in its place—then the China Steam swap follows in much the same 
tradition, serving as a propaganda archive in order to, indeed, “set the record straight.” And 
just as the Manchu authorities and their Han-Chinese collaborators sought to stamp out the 
representational spaces of their critics through fear, friction, and flooding, the CCP has made 
a relatively smooth transition from this notion of “imperial space” to a “(post-) socialist 
space,” making the most of the new technologies at their disposal (i.e. the GFW). On the 
other hand, if the Siku and China Steam represent official propaganda archives, then the 
space of the Steam Workshop is just as much what Abigail De Kosnik has called a “rogue 
archive,” or a kind unauthorized storage space for roguish discourses and ideologies. And if 
China Steam exemplifies the incursion of post-socialist space, then Chinese gamers have 
“poached” and “made do” with the Steam Workshop as a tactical safe space, “modding” the 
 
 
 23 
space to their own aims and ends. Having established these historical precedents and 
connections between modding and censorship, between propaganda archives and rogue 
archives, and between the Siku and China Steam, I will now turn to the theoretical framework 
from which I conceptualize modding, or a tactical safe space. And as we shall see, the West 
has its own precedents of modding as well, most notably in the form of fan fiction. 
 
Paratextual Activity: Conceptualizing Modding and Tactical Safe Spaces 
While there are certainly other ways to conceptualize modding—whether as a novel 
configuration of Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin’s “remediation”65, as part of the larger 
“remix culture” put forth by Lawrence Lessig66, or as an example of Azuma Hiroki’s 
“databaseification”67—fan fiction or fandom studies offers a more pertinent theoretical 
framework given its proximity to modding as a cultural activity. At least in the U.S., the 
beginning of fan fiction has often been attributed to the early fandom surrounding Gene 
Roddenberry’s hit NBC TV show Star Trek (1966-1969) and its franchise of additional 
series, feature films, literature, games, and other spinoffs. Fan studies scholars such as Henry 
Jenkins, Constance Penley, Lincoln Geraghty, Heather Joseph-Witham, and Larisa 
Mikhaylova have all tackled this phenomenon of “trekkies” from different perspectives,68 but 
perhaps most important for our analysis here is their common theoretical ground: numerous 
fandom scholars have engaged with the work of a pair of French thinkers (Gérard Genette 
and Michel de Certeau) and a kind of conceptual vocabulary they introduced in two seminal 
works published in the 1980s. Genette provided the field with two of its most fundamental 
concepts in “paratexts” and “hypertexts,” the former of which he defines as “a title, a subtitle, 
intertitles; prefaces, postfaces, notices, forwards, etc.; marginal, infrapaginal, terminal notes; 
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epigraphs; illustrations; blurbs, book covers, dust jackets, and many other kinds of secondary 
signals, whether allographic or autographic” and the latter as “any text derived from a 
previous text” either through simple transformation or more indirect imitation.69 A mod 
represents a hypertext, while the archival and communal spaces surrounding these mods are 
more paratextual in nature. On its own, a mod cannot entirely exist outside of the original 
game text, but through the process of modification, the game text and its associated spaces 
are also changed into something slightly—if not entirely—new. Additionally, Genette’s 
discussion of parody is also fruitful for looking at such “paratextual activity” as fan fiction 
and modding; tracing the etymological roots of the term back to its original Greek context 
and to Aristotle’s understanding of parodia, Genette characterizes parody as “singing beside: 
that is, singing off key; or singing in another voice—in counterpoint; or again, singing in 
another key—deforming, therefore, or transposing a melody.”70 Like parody, modding 
entails a deformation of a text, and one which indeed is often satiric in nature. As shall be 
shown below, the vast majority of the Chinese-language mods on the Steam Workshop are 
either humorous, satiric, or draw on other media; in other words, mods are (almost always) 
parodies. Finally, if, as Genette claims, “parody is always already present and alive in the 
maternal womb” of traditional verbal and literary media forms such as rhapsody,71 then 
modding is most definitely already present in the game text, both in spirit and technically in 
the game’s code. Unlike fan fiction (which has itself since moved onto digital platforms), 
modding was born in the digital era, and thus mods themselves are born both literally and 
figuratively from game texts, only further intensifying the aforementioned Web 2.0 processes 
of remediation, remix culture, and databaseification. In a Chinese context, however, these 
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hyper- and paratexts are perhaps more politically-charged, as the “grand hypotext” modders 
seek to parody is the state ideology of the PRC itself. 
Whereas Genette provides a conceptual vocabulary for looking at fan fiction and 
modding, another French theorist, Michel de Certeau, supplies his own more politically-
charged terminology (“making-do,” “poaching,” “strategies and tactics,” “bricolage,” 
“Brownian movements”) which is ultimately more relevant for a Chinese context. The crux 
of these terms, which fan studies scholars like Jenkins and Penley turn to for the theoretical 
underpinnings of their research, is best summed up in de Certeau’s own words: “the 
consumer cannot be identified or qualified by the [cultural] or commercial products he 
assimilates: between the person (who uses them) and these products (indexes of the ‘order’ 
which is imposed on him), there is a gap of varying proportions opened by the use that he 
makes of them.”72 In other words, the consumer or fan pries open this gap by making use of 
media products to create something of his or her own, whether in the form of fan fiction or 
mods. Indeed, this connection between de Certeau and fan-produced hypertexts has also been 
made with regard to modding; Anne-Marie Schleiner characterizes the “act of the modder’s 
appropriation of the pre-existing game” as a manifestation of de Certeau’s notion of 
poaching.73 In the context of Chinese modders on Steam, however, employing de Certeau’s 
strategies and tactics are perhaps more productive as these terms take on a dual meaning: the 
politically-charged power structures Chinese modders operate in represent more than just a 
producer-product-consumer relationship; there is, in fact, an additional layer of “authority” 
for Chinese fans to deal with, or the PRC government itself, which on the mainland (and 
increasingly in Hong Kong and Macau74) not only exerts the traditional ideological influence 
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of a centralized nation-state, but also directly interferes on each level (producer-product-
consumer) of this mediated capitalist relationship through propaganda and censorship. 
In this framework, de Certeau ties strategies to place and the postulation of power, 
while tactics are associated with time and the absence of power. Yang’s notion of a “spatial 
struggle” is especially relevant here, as Chinese modders and the PRC government are 
essentially fighting for control over the literal and figurative space of the Steam platform and 
Workshop. Put differently, the spatial struggle over cyberspace is marked by the post-
socialist space of the Party-nation-state imposing on and indeed seeking to stamp out the 
representational spaces of its critics, while these critics seek out a space where they have 
adequate time to archive and even develop their roguish discourses and ideologies. As de 
Certeau suggests, “strategies are able to produce, tabulate, and impose these spaces… 
whereas tactics can only use, manipulate, and divert these spaces”75; correspondingly, the 
primary tactics of Chinese gamers have been not only to poach and mod mainstream media, 
but also to utilize VPNs in order to find a tactical safe space outside of the Great Firewall 
where they can openly produce, share, and discuss content, thus materializing their 
“representational space.” The strategies of the PRC government, on the other hand, include 
not only issuing propaganda, but also censoring, deleting, and suppressing content within the 
“space” under its control, as well as blocking, appropriating, and compromising entire spaces 
normally outside of its jurisdiction, such as Steam. Yet whereas in the past a platform like 
Twitter would simply be blocked and replaced with a Chinese equivalent like Weibo, the 
Chinese government now seeks to bring these foreign spaces directly under CCP supervision 
by creating a “China Steam” which simultaneously leaves intact and erases Steam in its 
original form, a move highly reminiscent of the Siku quanshu and National Project of Qing 
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History mentioned above. Taking these factors into account, a “rogue archive” such as the 
Steam Workshop becomes all the more significant, as the act of archiving material targeted 
for censorship by the Chinese authorities becomes a tactic in itself. 
Rogue archives, one of the two terms I have been using throughout this paper to 
describe how Chinese gamers and modders “make do” with the Steam Workshop, derives 
from Abigail De Kosnik’s book of the same name, Rogue Archives: Digital Cultural Memory 
and Media Fandom. Likewise, De Kosnik herself draws this title for her discussion on fan 
fiction archives from the work of Jacques Derrida, who relates the traditional figure of the 
“rogue” to democracy and the process of democratization.76 While De Kosnik does not 
directly follow up on Derrida’s meta-political analysis, she does indicate that with the rise of 
“digital networked media…ties binding public memory to the state began to loosen” and 
these technologies thus have the potential to “democratize cultural memory.”77 De Kosnik’s 
largely Anglo-American focus on English-language fandoms and social issues emanating 
from a Western context leads her to explore what has been “excluded or ignored” from this 
mainstream cultural archive; all the while, two-thirds of the world’s internet users live under 
regimes with government censorship,78 most of all in China, where the question to be 
explored might instead be what is “censored or suppressed” from an archive which is 
distinctively global in scope. As hinted in the introduction, the Great Firewall of China works 
both ways: PRC state censorship mechanisms do not simply “wall off” Chinese internet users 
from the outside world; they also wall off the outside world from a Chinese context, as 
Chinese internet users and the content they produce are increasingly funneled in and 
restricted to local internet platforms directly under CCP supervision which do not gain much 
traction outside of the PRC (a “friction” strategy which echoes the isolationist policies of the 
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late Qing Dynasty, or “closing the passes and sealing off the country” 閉關鎖國). In this 
sense, I seek to “modify” De Kosnik’s rather strict definition of a rogue archive, which by 
her own admission would not include corporate platforms such as YouTube, Tumblr, or 
Steam, and instead link it back to Derrida’s more directly-political understanding of the term 
rogue and his broader notion of “democracy to come.” The Steam Workshop does not, in 
fact, tally with De Kosnik’s definition in that 1) Valve is a corporate entity which engages in 
at least some policing of its content for copyright or social reasons, 2) it permits developers 
to limit the Workshop parameters of their games, restricting certain types of mods from 
showing up in the archive, and 3) the content of the Workshop is also managed by the 
modding community and can be taken down at any point by individual modders themselves, 
making the archive relatively fluid and unstable. For the same reasons, the Workshop does 
not easily fit into De Kosnik’s categories of universal, community, and alternative archives, 
but in a Chinese context, these classifications may simply be superfluous; for Chinese users, 
the characteristics of the Steam Workshop represent a pronounced upgrade from domestic 
social networks, forums, and fan sites where users’ content is incessantly prone to direct 
censorship and control by the PRC government. In other words, the rogues have found a safe 
space of their own. 
Indeed, the fact that Steam has not been blocked outright by the CCP is a testament to 
the tactic of Chinese gamers making it into a space of their own, forcing the authorities to 
tread lightly and resort to the censorship mechanism of friction. WeChat blogger “Yeah, 
yeah, yeah, you’re all industry insiders” (对对对你们都是业内) comments on the Party’s 
uneasy tolerance of (and now uneasy alliance with) this “Valve” for gamers to let off 
“Steam”: 
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Neihan Duanzi [a popular Chinese humor site run by new tech giant Bytedance] also 
had several thousand Chinese users and it was shut down in a snap, so why couldn’t 
Steam be, too? Because behind Neihan Duanzi was a Chinese company, so shutting it 
down mean that both the app and the community were totally gone. When the tree 
falls, the monkeys scatter. But Steam can’t be destroyed like that because it has 
foreign roots. If it were suddenly blocked, hundreds of thousands or maybe even 
millions of users would jump the Great Firewall to use it out of habit. This would 
create a difficult to predict or maybe even catastrophic situation. A blocked Steam 
would result in many very angry gamers. On the other side of the Great Firewall, they 
might well express their disapproval on Steam’s community pages through posts, 
games, pictures, short videos, and memes. Gathering rapidly, they would call into 
question and criticize the censors’ decisions and amplify each other’s anger to 
become a powerful current that would echo back into the country and make waves 
abroad. No wonder the relevant agencies have to take a more measured approach.79 
 
For these angry Chinese users, the Steam Workshop thus serves as not only a rogue archive, 
but also what I call a tactical safe space, or a space for the production, circulation, and 
“modification” of politically-sensitive discourses and roguish ideologies. “Tactical” is of 
course poached from de Certeau’s understanding of the term, while “safe space” is drawn 
from its popular and academic usage which is purported to have been coined by American 
LGBT groups in the 1960s. In a Chinese context, these tactical safe spaces are marked by 
both their technological and ideological characteristics: the Workshop’s servers are located 
beyond the borders of the PRC (for the time being) and outside of the CCP’s jurisdiction—
thus blocked by the GFW and requiring a VPN to access, while the spaces themselves serve 
not so much as echo chambers but rather as a “public sphere” where different sociopolitical 
discourses can be openly engaged with and debated. In fact, as we shall see below, Chinese 
modders on the Steam Workshop have been able to partake in a wide variety of discursive 
activities including discourse competition, pop activism, and culture jamming, tactically 
adapting the space to their own ends. Yet as some feminist studies scholars have noted, no 
safe space is truly safe,80 and thus the users of these spaces must be both tactical and 
resourceful—always ready for their next move (both literally and figuratively)—in order to 
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keep their “representational spaces” a reality. With all of this in mind, then, I now turn to the 
research from my “guerilla netnography” on how Chinese Steam users have made do with 
the Workshop as a tactical safe space and rogue archive—developing, deliberating, and 
indeed safekeeping their politically-sensitive mods and roguish ideologies even as they are 
“left for dead.” 
 
Left for Dead 2: Roguish Chinese Mods on the Steam Workshop 
This project was originally inspired by the Chinese-language Workshop content of 
Left 4 Dead 2 (L4D2), an FPS zombie-apocalypse survival game released by Valve in 2009.81 
L4D2 features both single and multiplayer gameplay, including cooperative and versus 
modes, where players can control human survivors (or so-called “Special Infected” zombies 
in versus mode) and fight their way through a zombie apocalypse—organized in a cinematic 
story stretching across a number of campaigns with three to five maps each. Even before its 
release, L4D2 was controversial for its perceived brazen normativization of ultraviolent 
content, getting banned or partially censored in countries like Australia, Germany, Japan, and 
the UK while also facing such disparate accusations as corporate greed and racism.82 By 
2013, L4D2 had been updated with Workshop support, and since then, part of the success of 
its Workshop can be attributed to the game’s status as an in-house or flagship title, meaning 
that it was developed and produced by Valve itself and put out through their own digital 
distribution platform, or Steam. This home-field advantage of sorts results in particularly 
aggressive marketing and sales, extensive Steam-based server support, and an “anything 
goes” mentality with regard to modding opportunities in the Workshop, where Valve games 
like L4D2 still hold a healthy lead over their competitors. For example, at the time of writing 
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Valve’s Garry’s Mod has amassed over 1,300,000 mods in its Workshop, Portal 2 maintains 
around 687,000, and CS: GO has 281,000—consider that only approximately 22% of 
Workshop games have reached the 1000-mod mark.83 While L4D2’s current total of 57,000 
may not sound like much in comparison, the relative flexibility and variety of modding 
opportunities (characters, campaigns, maps, weapons, items, sounds, scripts, UI, and so on) 
available through Valve’s Source SDK (software development kit) and its associated Left 4 
Dead 2 Authoring Tools facilitates the production of more roguish mods than the curated and 
“policed” Workshops of TF2 and DOTA 2, not to mention when compared to the extremely 
limited parameters (mostly maps and/or campaigns) of the Portal 2 Workshop. And while I 
had originally wanted to conduct research on the full lineup of Valve’s Workshop-supported 
titles84 as well as games on Steam which are 1) tagged as moddable, 2) offer simplified-
Chinese language support, and 3) contain over 1000 mods on their Workshop, I soon found 
that the mods in L4D2 were more than sufficient to be representative of the Chinese-language 
content shared across the Workshop as a whole. Either way, a mass of Chinese gamers and 
modders have gradually populated the Workshop just as they have “invaded” the Steam 
platform, sharing their mods and content amongst one another and ultimately with the rest of 
the world. 
In this section, I share and analyze the findings from what might be called my 
“guerilla netnography” of the L4D2 Workshop and its Chinese userbase. By guerilla 
netnography, I refer to Guobin Yang’s notion of a “guerilla ethnography” fused with the 
methodology of “netnography” as introduced by Robert V. Kozinets85; in short, I have 
conducted detached, anonymous, and yet deeply-engaged semi-ethnographic archival 
research on the social network of Chinese Steam users and the Chinese-language Workshop 
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content they produce, share, and comment on. By Chinese-language Workshop content, I 
refer to mods and their associated paratexts (avatars, descriptions, comment sections, and so 
on) marked by either a prevalence of Chinese characters (simplified or traditional) or which 
reflect what could be perceived as distinctly “Chinese” characteristics such as culture-
specific artifacts, social issues, and memes. Some of these hypertexts were not even authored 
by Chinese modders themselves but are still poached by Chinese users in the mods’ comment 
sections and forum discussions, which are also reviewed below. Pinpointing this content 
involved searching within the L4D2 Workshop for broad queries such as “China” (中国) as 
well as more specific keywords, tags, and other relevant terms in both Chinese and English. 
While a majority of the Chinese-language content in the L4D2 Workshop has been adapted 
from other games as well as from what is some borderline-pornographic Japanese anime,86 I 
have identified three categories of roguish mods which consist of either 1) patriotic or 
nationalist themes, marked by “discourse competition,” 2) sensitive sociopolitical satire in 
the form of “pop activism,” or 3) subversive memes such as “Moha Culture” or “The Elder” 
which represent a kind of “culture jamming.” Taken together, these mods and their modders 
have found a tactical safe space and rogue archive in the Steam Workshop for the 
preservation and development of sensitive sociopolitical discourses which are all too often 
censored back in China—even when those discourses are patriotic in nature.  
 
Modded in China: Nationalistic Mods and Discourse Competition 
Compared with the relatively tame output for TF2 and Portal 2, the “anything goes,” 
wild west-like atmosphere of the L4D2 Workshop makes it an ideal place to begin examining 
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the rogue archives of Chinese mods on Steam. First of all, there is a wide variety of patriotic 
and distinctly-Chinese cultural artifacts modded into the game, usually in the form of 
weapons or items (figure 1.3). Some of these are modeled off actual People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) arms (e.g. military assault rifles), while others depict guns and melee weapons 
imprinted with either the red and yellow color scheme of the “Five Star” Chinese flag or the 
blue and white porcelain (青花瓷) pattern associated with traditional Chinese pottery (or in 
one case, the Chinese flag as a weapon itself, essentially used to beat down and kill one’s 
enemies). There are also projectiles in the form of mooncakes (月饼) and Chinese milk tea 
brands (阿萨姆奶茶), healing items reimagined as Chinese food (steamed stuffed buns, lamb 
kebabs, and beer), as well as melee weapons like the magical staff (如意金箍棒) wielded by 
Sun Wukong in Journey to the West, a Tang Dynasty sword, and a real-life kitchen knife 
manufactured by a Hong Kong company which the modder claims to use in his or her home 
(pictured). Accompanying these items are campaigns and characters of a similarly patriotic 
bent, such as a rendering of a “bloody battle” (血戰) at the Bund in Shanghai during the War 
of Resistance against Japan (alongside other maps set in Chinese locations such as high 
schools, train stations, and villages), or a group of PLA soldiers which replace the human 
survivors. Finally, while L4D2 provides simplified Chinese language-support, there are also 
language-based mods which supply further translation of in-game material (e.g. posters and 
graffiti) as well as the addition of Chinese sound effects and music (rap).  
Most of the Chinese-language comments on these mods are generally supportive in 
nature (e.g.“赞一个”“不错”“好看”“好评”“无敌”“帅”“很强势”“china 
no. 1”“666” “233333”), but sometimes discussions in comment sections can take a 
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Figure 1.3. Patriotic or nationalist Chinese mods in the L4D2 Workshop. Collage compiled November 2018. 
 
radically political turn. For example, in the comment section of the PLA soldiers mod 
mentioned above, the third commenter from the bottom (known colloquially in Chinese as 
the “third floor” 三楼 / 3L) sets off a firestorm of sorts when he or she states that “This is the 
army of the Party, not the army of the country and the people. It’s the ‘Party’s Defense 
Army’” (这是党的军队 不是国家和人民的军队，是党卫军). Other users soon respond by 
telling the third floor commenter that he or she “should read more” (3楼该多读书) and “a 
brain is a good thing” (3L，脑子是个好东西) while another user offers a more qualified 
retort: “The third floor is going to be flattened by a tank… Fortunately this is Steam, 
otherwise every minute there would be people ‘checking the water meter’” (3L要被坦克压
了.....幸亏这里是 steam，不然分分钟水表).87 The tank reference in itself sets off an 
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additional firestorm in which commenters begin making allusions to or directly debating the 
Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 (六四) when tanks rolled through the streets and over the 
people of Beijing, but the discussion ultimately devolves into crude name-calling whereupon 
several Chinese users refer to the third floor as a “Taiwan dog” (台湾狗), most likely 
because the user’s profile lists his or her country or region as Taiwan (even though the user is 
typing in simplified Chinese, which is primarily used in the mainland). Finally, near the end 
of the full list of comments (165 at the time of writing), a commenter comes to the defense of 
the third floor claiming that “The third floor’s words are coarse, but his or her logic is 
anything but; in my country the Party indeed commands the guns” (三楼话糙理不糙，我国
确实是党指挥枪), while another addresses the modder directly in English, saying 
“AUTHOR, I am sorry about there are so many irrational men calling each other names. Just 
ignore them! I like your models very much!” Simply put, this kind of politically sensitive 
discourse would most likely be censored or self-censored on Chinese social and gaming 
networks. Whether via a mod, post, comments section, group chat (群聊), or increasingly 
even in private conversations between individual users on apps like QQ and WeChat, the 
“post-socialist space” of the PRC state security apparatus is making its presence known (and 
often circuitously through self-censorship by the platforms and users themselves88). As a 
result, Chinese internet users on both sides of the political spectrum find a space in the 
Workshop which, while not necessarily civil, is nonetheless “safe” for this kind of political 
discussion.  
This tactical safe space is also characterized by what Rongbin Han has called 
“discourse competition,” or a situation where “state and nonstate actors attempt to engineer 
popular opinion and construct beliefs, values, and identities online” and in which cyber-
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communities “become battlefields of multiple discourses as netizens with distinct political 
orientations coexist or compete.”89 As Han notes, the dominant modes of discourse 
competition (unfortunately) include “defamation and attack,” which are also regularly 
employed in the LFD2 Workshop: some of the discussions in these mods’ comment sections 
rapidly deteriorate into ugly nationalistic debates between mainland Chinese and Taiwanese, 
even implicating other nationalities such as South Koreans and Americans. For example, in 
the comment section of a “QBZ-95” Chinese assault rifle mod, one commenter responds to a 
South Korean user whose remarks have since been deleted with “Death to your mother, you 
Korean thug, you just have to go looking for a fight on Steam. Can I trouble everyone to send 
in a wave of reports on him? In the many games I’ve played, the Korean thugs I’ve 
encountered all have low character—a garbage country will really produce garbage people” 
(司马棒子，非要在 steam引战，麻烦大家举报一波，我玩很多游戏遇到的棒子素质都
极低，真是垃圾国家出垃圾人民).90 Another comment echoes this sentiment: “Come and 
see, everybody, it’s a feral Korean ‘keyboard hero,’ maybe we can take this kid and boil him 
into soup, nobody wants this grandkid’s boiled soup” (来来来大家看看，野生的韩国键盘
侠，这孩子也许能拿来炖汤 这孙子炖汤都没人要).91 Following these two, there are other, 
more vulgar remarks which I will not reproduce here, as well as some snide comments in 
English about Chinese gamers and products, but the point is that these nationalistic mods 
tend provoke this kind of discourse competition precisely because of the echo chamber of 
Chinese social and gaming networks. As mentioned earlier, on account of the Great Firewall, 
Chinese and non-Chinese internet users do not often encounter each another online, therefore 
when the two sides collide in the comment sections of these patriotic Chinese mods (or of 
other “nationalistic” symbols such Taiwanese and South Korean weapons and flags, or even 
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a concert of classic Hong Kong pop music on a stage draped with the colonial-era British 
flag), fireworks can ensue. And while one would assume that Chinese authorities would turn 
a blind eye to this kind of patriotic or nationalist discourse, this is increasingly not the case,92 
and so frustrated Chinese gamers and modders resort not only to the tactic of crossing the 
Firewall, but also to reinterpreting or poaching mainstream media—both Chinese and 
foreign—in the form of satire. 
 
Sticking it to the State: Sociopolitical Satire and Pop Activism 
 An apt example to begin this section on satirical and sociopolitically-sensitive 
hypertexts is with the poaching of mass media symbols themselves, where Chinese gamers 
mod the state television “CCTV” logo onto the HUD (heads up display) of the game and 
sometimes in relation to certain memes discussed below.93 These mods produce the effect of 
making the computer screen appear more like a TV or movie channel, an irony not lost on 
Chinese commenters: “Mom, I’m watching a movie, not playing games” (麻麻，我在看电
影。没有玩游戏) or “An interactive movie, haha” (互动电影，233). Yet more 
significantly, the presence of this logo also evokes the power of the PRC state itself, leading 
other commenters to call out the author of the mod in a whimsical mix of censure and 
trepidation: “You’re looking for trouble, big time” (作大死), “Water meter” (水表), or “The 
water meter’s already been demolished” (水表已拆). This diverse range of responses can be 
understood as a product of what Rongbin Han calls “pop activism,” or the playful mix of pop 
culture and politics in online discourse. Han maintains that pop activism is primarily driven 
by “dynamics of state control and anti-control, the discourse competition between various 
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Figure 1.4. L4D2 mods exhibiting sociopolitical satire within a “Greater China” context. Collage compiled 
November 2018. 
 
online groups (including both pro- and anti-regime groups), as well as netizens’ pursuit of 
fun” and is also focused on such themes as “concerns about disadvantaged social groups, 
criticism of corruption, patriotism, and the pursuit of freedom, justice, and democracy.”94 As 
can be seen above, mods featuring CCTV logo can elicit different responses from different 
types of commenters, either in the mode of playing with the political or vice-versa—
politicizing the playful. The ambiguity of such discourse is itself a product of life under 
censorship—a dynamic replicated even outside of the GFW. Taken further, pop activism can 
also be related to modding; as Han explains, “since consumers can actively engage in 
reproduction and redistribution, they may take the original message out of its packaging and 
replace it with a new one.”95 Whether supportive, critical, or simply ambivalent towards the 
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Party-nation-state, Chinese gamers partake in pop activism by modding both technologies 
and ideologies on the tactical safe space of the Steam Workshop. 
Other, more spectacularly playful and political symbols provoke an even greater 
reaction from Chinese users. In one mordant example, the hammer and sickle of Communism 
replaces large chunks of rock and pavement which the boss-like “Tank” zombie-character 
lobs at players over the course of a match. Again, the irony of pairing Communist imagery 
with a so-called “tank” is not lost on Chinese commenters: “Communist tank, haha” (共产主
义坦克 233), “I don’t believe in Communism, Li Ming.jpg” (我不信共产主义了，李
明.jpg), and “Adding on this evil symbol suddenly makes it even more evil than zombies” 
(加上这个邪恶的标志瞬间比僵尸还要邪恶). While the vast majority of users seem in on 
the fun—making the usual references to state agents checking the water meter, delivering 
packages, and dropping in for unexpected visits—some commenters are taken aback by the 
outspokenness of the modder himself. In the mod description, the author quips that “Now all 
these Tanks believe in that same old bullshit of the Communist Party” (现在这些 Tank 都信
奉共产党的那套鬼话了), to which one user responds, “Isn’t this reactionary? 
Communist…bull…shit?” (这不是反动吗。。。共产的。。鬼？？话？？). Another 
takes offense, “Communism is not bullshit!” (共产主义不是鬼话！), while other 
commenters seem to lament the blocking of the Steam Community in the mainland on 
account of politically sensitive mods like this one: “This is one of the reasons the Community 
was walled off: doing everything you can to vilify the CCP, supporting Taiwanese 
independence, and opposing One China, you’re really too awesome” (社区被墙的原因之
一，使劲黑 GD、支持台独、反对一个中国，稳的不行).96  
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Moreover, satire of the Party-nation-state can also be embodied in caricatures of state 
agents themselves, such as chengguan (城管), or thug-like officers from City Urban 
Administrative and Law Enforcement Bureaus who have come under heavy criticism both 
domestically and abroad for their brutality.97 One modder lampoons chengguan via a mod in 
which the efficacy of their characteristic “nightstick” (警棍) is enhanced, described at length 
by the modder in colorful, sardonic language complete with his or her own English 
translations: 
中国最强作战部队——城管的武器现已加入求生组 
Now you can pick up the China No.1 "army"——chengguan's weapon in L4d2. 
 
抄起家伙，与小伙伴一起执法！ 
Use it and "enforce the law" with your friends! Wwwwwwww 
 
告诉小僵尸，特感谁怕谁 
Tell the infected and the special infected "Nothing can beat me!" 
 
告诉 TANK,WITCH谁是老大！ 
Tell Tank and Witch "Who's your Daddy!" 
 
 
After sticking it to state symbols and agents, modders then turn to state apparatuses, even 
going for a dip across the Taiwan Strait. For example, the same author of the hammer and 
sickle mod above incorporates Taiwan’s legislature, or the Legislative Yuan (立法院), into 
the game as a survival map (figure 1.4). While the general response in the comments (88 at 
the time of writing) from both mainland Chinese and Taiwanese users is surprisingly muted, 
divergent sociopolitical discourses slowly but surely come out of the woodwork over the 
course of this anxious cross-strait exchange. On the one hand, Taiwanese users 
overwhelming rejoice in the author’s “accurate” portrayal of the daily disorder of the 
legislature: “As a Taiwanese, I feel extremely satisfied with your reproduction of the day-to-
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day of the Legislative Yuan (joking)” (身為台灣人，對於您重現了立法院日常感到非常
滿意 (滑稽 [sic]).98 Other Taiwanese commenters relate the map to the Sunflower Student 
Movement of 2014, when student demonstrators stormed and occupied the legislature for a 
month to protest a trade agreement with the mainland: “The Sunflower Student Movement 
redux” (太陽花學運再現). Some of these Taiwanese users’ remarks are patriotic in nature 
(“Long live the Republic of China!” 中華民國萬歲！！) while others are considerably more 
critical (“The KMT has left a legacy of trouble for our world—first they brought disaster on 
China, and then on Taiwan—they’re rotten to the core!” KMT 遺害人間，先禍害 China再
禍害台灣，爛透！！). Finally, like their mainland counterparts mentioned above, several 
Taiwanese commenters show concern for the modder’s well-being: “Friend, you made this 
[ROC] flag so big, I’m a little worried about your safety” (朋友，這旗子放這麼大，我有點
擔心你的安全). On the mainland, meanwhile, some commenters become particularly 
sensitive to the wording of the mod’s title, “The Legislative Yuan of the Taiwanese 
Authorities” (台湾当局立法院), calling instead for its location to be referred to as the 
legislature of “Taiwan province” (台湾省). One mainland user even has a beef with the 
mod’s description, observing that “The author describes, ‘This is the Legislative Yuan of the 
government of the Taiwanese authorities—it is equivalent to their congress.’ Shouldn’t you 
add quotes around ‘congress?’” (作者描述"这是台湾当局政府的立法院，相当于是他们
的国会了。"里面"国会"不加双引号的？).99 Lastly, variations of the meme phrase “What’s 
that? My Great Qing has perished?” (什么？ 大清亡了？) proliferate in the comment 
section, likely in reaction to a portrait hung in the legislature of Sun Zhongshan—the 
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founding father of the Republic of China (ROC; now equated with Taiwan) who overthrew 
the Qing Dynasty in the 1911 Revolution.100 
Taken together, there is almost a tacit understanding between users on both sides of 
the Taiwan Strait not to delve into the kinds of ugly nationalistic debates and discourse 
competition detailed above, as both parties seem to acknowledge the significance of having a 
tactical safe space to propagate, deliberate on, and indeed satirize these issues. In fact, Sino-
specific satire on the L4D2 Workshop is not limited to the realm of politics; there are also 
broader forms of pop activism including anti-Japanese, anti-American, and anti-Korean 
protest signs parodying Chinese nationalism, high school English and math textbooks poking 
fun at the Chinese education system, fake money burned as offerings to the dead (冥币) in an 
apparent send-up of traditional Chinese culture, as well as renderings of controversial figures 
like Tencent CEO Ma Huateng whose QQ instant messenger/social network and its penguin 
logo is also modded into the game. Inevitably, the content of some of these mods becomes 
reminiscent of memes, and indeed several “meme-mods” show up in the Workshop precisely 
because they have been relentlessly censored and suppressed behind the Great Firewall. 
These subversive memes and their associated mods are analyzed below. 
 
“Too Violent!”: “Moha Culture” and Culture Jamming 
As an active and longtime patron of Steam and its Chinese-language community, I 
was not surprised to find some familiar “faces” populating the Workshop, including zhuangbi 
(装逼), huaji (滑稽), and “Doge” facial expressions, guichu (鬼畜) sound effects ripped from 
viral videos in China, as well as spoofs of historical figures such as the Tang Dynasty poet 
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Du Fu and more contemporary cultural material like Hong Kong TV series. Some of the most 
well-represented memes on the L4D2 Workshop include “Philosophy” (哲学), a meme 
originating in Japan which involves softcore gay porn,101 and “Jinkela” (金坷垃), a fertilizer 
brand from Henan Province whose advertisements have been parodied by Chinese internet 
users for years on end.102 Most of these memes can also be found on Chinese social networks 
and video sites such as Weibo and bilibili, but there are a few select examples which are 
consistently censored and suppressed by the CCP because of their politically or socially 
sensitive nature, and as a result, these subversive “meme-mods” tend to show up in droves 
within the largely unpoliced archives of the Workshop. While the satirical mods analyzed in 
the previous section similarly depict sensitive sociopolitical content, they predominantly 
represent individual cases not tied to any specific meme and are generally not as popular on 
the Workshop as the mods analyzed here. For example, some of the “Moha Culture” meme-
mods I introduce below maintain between 2000-8000 subscribers and 200-500 comments 
apiece, whereas the CCTV logo mod discussed above only boasts 200 subscribers and twenty 
comments, and the chengguan mod has ninety and ten, respectively. As such, these 
subversive meme-mods represent the core of the rogue archive of Chinese mods on Steam: 
“rogue” in that they are strategically targeted by the PRC state, and “archived” by Chinese 
modders in the tactical safe space of the Workshop. 
One of the most enduring and indeed relentlessly censored subversive memes is “The 
Elder” (长者), also known as “Moha Culture” (膜蛤文化 or “toad worship culture”103), 
which refers to the online cult surrounding former Chinese President Jiang Zemin (1926- ). 
Jiang reigned as President of the PRC from 1993-2003 and also served in other leadership 
roles from 1987-2005. His boastful, outspoken style and willingness to engage with foreign 
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media has left a profound impression on a whole generation of post-80s and 90s young 
Chinese,104 in stark contrast to his relatively monotonous, bureaucratic predecessors and 
successors in Deng Xiaoping, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping. Jiang also remains a highly 
controversial figure, given that his terms in office (coming right after the Tiananmen protests 
of 1989) have been linked to spells of unchecked corruption, the persecution of minority and 
religious groups, and the laying off (下岗) of millions of workers from state enterprises in the 
1990s,105 and it is even rumored that Jiang still wields an immense amount of power in the 
Party at the ripe old age of 92.106 The cult or “worship” of Jiang originated with a video of a 
2000 press conference in Hong Kong where local journalists grilled Jiang and then-Hong 
Kong Chief Executive Dong Jianhua on the transparency of the election process in the 
newly-minted Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR).107 Departing from the 
scripted performances of his predecessors, Jiang elected to lash back at the journalists and 
lecture them as a self-professed “elder,” a tirade which ultimately provided Chinese internet 
users with a treasure trove of memorable quotes and moments to poach and make do with as 
memes. This video was complemented by two others: 1) Jiang’s 2000 CBS interview with 
Mike Wallace, which he also made reference to in his Hong Kong rant, and 2) a 2009 
reunion at the China United Engineering Corporation, where Jiang had once worked as an 
engineer.108 Taken together, a whole host of oblique references, audiovisual parodies, and 
other fan “paratextual activity” stemming from these videos make up the crux of the Moha or 
Elder meme, and many of these intertexts have found a safe space in the archive of the L4D2 
Workshop. 
On his personal website, Confessions of an ACA-Fan, Henry Jenkins has posted a 
2018 essay by Qiyao Peng, a student in Jenkins’s grad seminar Participatory Politics and 
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Civic Media at USC. Peng’s currently unpublished paper examines Moha Culture through 
the lens of culture jamming and civic imagination, and is also helpful for looking at the Moha 
mods analyzed here. Working from Marilyn DeLaure and Moritz Fink’s notion of “culture 
jamming,”109 or “a series of tactics used by activists to critique, subvert, and ‘jam’ the 
dominant forms of power,” Peng argues that the hypertextual videos, pictures, and memes (or 
in this case, mods) produced by Moha fans not only represent transgressive, political attacks 
on PRC censorship mechanisms, but also serve as a nostalgic, rose-tinted foil to the 
increasingly authoritarian reign of current Chinese President Xi Jinping.110 Moreover, Peng 
demonstrates that participating in Moha Culture equates to a form of culture jamming in that 
it tallies with DeLaure and Fink’s definitive characteristics of the concept; in addition to 
poaching other material, Moha memes and mods are artful, playful, anonymous, 
participatory, political, serial in nature, as well as transgressive and boundless. In short, 
Moha meme-mods “confront authority with imagination” and maintain an “emphasis on play 
and having fun while attacking dominant ideologies.”111 Even then, as with the work of de 
Certeau and De Kosnik above, some “modifications” are in order when considering culture 
jamming in a Chinese context, and these alterations can even be seen in Peng’s own 
paraphrasing (quoted above) of DeLaure and Fink’s original definition of the term.112 
Broadly speaking, while culture jamming scholars in the West focus overwhelmingly on 
Euro-American contexts and are thus inevitably concerned with issues of consumer 
capitalism and the corporatization of mainstream culture, Chinese jammers may concentrate 
more on issues of authoritarianism, censorship, and the repression of basic freedoms, which 
most Western jammers already have access to as they protest other matters. As indicated 
earlier, Chinese modders’ tactical jamming takes on a dual meaning as they mod foreign 
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media technologies (computer games on Steam) in order to disrupt hegemonic ideologies and 
narratives (“post-socialist space”) back home. 
Much like the examples from previous sections, Moha mods in L4D2 can be 
embodied in a wide variety of forms (figure 1.5). For one, there are first aid kits transformed 
into a popular 2005 biography of Jiang (The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy 
of Jiang Zemin《他改变了中国：江泽民传》by Robert Lawrence Kuhn) or simply 
reskinned with his face on them. There are pain pills modded as a Harbin-brand beer in a 
play of words on “Moha”113 and other supplements like “hong kong newsman adrenaline” 
[sic] shots. Predictably, there are also weapons, including a bloody axe with Jiang’s face 
plastered on it, not to mention a playable rendering of Jiang himself, replacing the human 
survivor-character nicknamed “Coach.” Finally, some mods are even integrated into the 
game’s user interface (UI) or HUD, such as a Jiang-themed logo for loading screens, a 
modded menu where images are replaced with gif memes of the Elder, and hit indicators 
refashioned in the meme-related expressions of “+1s” and “-1s.” These numerical 
expressions, “+1s” and “-1s,” represent a fundamental element of Moha Culture—xuming 
(续命), literally the “replenishing of life.” Here, xuming refers to the addition or subtraction 
of one second (s) onto either Jiang’s or one’s own life. As the longest living PRC leader who 
was once (in)famously rumored to have passed away,114 “toad fans” have become 
increasingly sensitive to Jiang’s feeble state, showing their support for him with a subtle 
“+1s” as well as to fans who conceive of clever, tactical ways to celebrate him—ultimately 
making Jiang’s annual birthdays a long day for Weibo censors.115 Conversely, because of the 
apparent sensitivity of these issues, participating too openly in Moha Culture is also 
considered harmful to one’s health (-1s), as government agents may come knocking to 
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Figure 1.5. Subversive “Moha” or “Elder” meme-mods. Collage compiled November 2018. 
 
“check the water meter” or invite one out to “drink tea.” As such, in the L4D2 Workshop, 
xuming expressions not only show up in the comment sections of mods as signs of approval 
or disapproval, but also are integrated into the mods themselves, giving modded healing 
items like the first aid kits (Jiang’s face and book), adrenaline shots (for Hong Kong 
journalists), and pain pills (Jiang-sponsored beer) introduced above a whole new meaning. In 
other words, these mods “replenish life” both in and outside of the game, and debates over 
their efficacy spill out into the comment sections. For example, in the comments of the 
Harbin beer/pain pills mod, users creatively come up with phrases to warn the modder of his 
or her impending doom: “Eating dates and pills” (吃枣药丸) becomes a homophone for 
“Sooner or later you’ll be finished” (迟早要完). Likewise, on the Jiang biography/first aid 
kit mod, another commenter jokes that “Isn’t it that the more you use this med kit, the less 
blood you’ll have?” (这个血包难道不是越用血越少？). Some of these admonitions 
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“poach” several of Jiang’s most famous lines in both Chinese and English, including “Don’t 
always try and make a big news story” (不要总想搞个大新闻), “You guys, you still need to 
study a certain someone” (你们啊，还需要学习一个),116 “Too young, too simple” (图样，
图森破), and of course, “Naive!” Other warnings are shared communally amongst the 
commenters, such as “We’ll see each other on our next accounts” (咱们下一个 ID见) or 
“Not one of you who subscribed to this mod will be able to get away” (订阅的一个都跑不
了), while yet others, like the water meter and tea examples mentioned earlier, are more 
direct: “Firing squad” (枪毙), “Being alive is no good, huh?” (活着不好吗), “I’ll replenish 
one second for you” (我为你续一秒), or “August is full! Schedule him for September’s 
[firing squad] list” (八月满了！九月名单安排下). Indeed, one of the most common 
admonishments in these Moha mods’ comment sections is “Too violent” (太暴力了), a 
somewhat dense phrase which requires further explanation.  
When internet commenters label a Moha meme as “violent” (暴力), they are 
expressing either a kind of awe-struck approval or an equally incredulous disapproval of the 
meme author’s degree of “toad worship.” In other words, they see the author as “violently 
worshipping” (暴力膜) Jiang, and this intense level of veneration unsurprisingly provokes 
strong reactions from fellow toad fans. On the tactical safe space of the L4D2 Workshop, 
“too violent” thus takes on additional connotations, given the controversially graphic nature 
of the game on the one hand, and the “violent” political discourses which this space 
facilitates and indeed archives on the other—a space which, at least for now, remains out of 
the reach of CCP censorship. Therefore, when a mod like the bloody Jiang axe (pictured) is 
produced, it serves not only as a tongue-in-cheek provocation to calls of violent worship, but 
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also as a reflection of the concrete danger (“new accounts,” “drinking tea,” “water meters,” 
“firing squads,” and so on) for Chinese internet users that such kinds culture jamming can 
entail (also reflecting the abovementioned censorship mechanism of “fear”). And as Chinese 
users continue to employ their highly-developed tactical language to debate and celebrate 
these sensitive mods, this discourse has found a safe harbor, or rather a safe archive, in the 
Steam Workshop—as opposed to the tight, relentless censorship it would face on a Chinese 
gaming platform like Tencent’s WeGame. As their language lingers on and this discourse 
steadily accumulates, the archive itself expands, and so does the attention it attracts from the 
PRC state. Unlike another one of Jiang’s famous euphemisms, “Keep silent and make big 
money,” (闷声发大财), Chinese users on Steam have been doing much the opposite: illicitly 
engaging with sensitive discourse, unproductively poaching official Chinese or foreign 
media, and brazenly developing a rogue archive on the tactical safe space of the Steam 
Workshop. But as Valve shuts the door on Steam in China, another archive will be broken, 
and Chinese users will once again be “left for dead.” 
 
Conclusion: Cacharros and Compromised Spaces 
 Logging off Steam and ferrying halfway across the world, we can encounter another 
(post-) socialist context where modding plays a pivotal role—both for the authorities and 
rogues alike. In Cuba, the image of classic American cars from the 1940s and 50s lining the 
streets of Havana has almost become cliché, but as Sarah Hill points out, there is more to 
these chrome-finned land yachts than meets the eye: “The original brand names tell merely 
the origins of Frankenstein inventions that continually morph through remaking into cars that 
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bear but superficial resemblance to their original selves.”117 In other words, these 
automobiles have been modded, not for aesthetic or performance reasons, but rather for 
survival. Thus what was once the pride of Detroit is no longer really American, and the 
“Cadillacs” cursed by Castro are now an integral part of the Cuban landscape, embodying 
something in-between—a tactical safe space challenging the sociopolitical status quo. 
Unsurprisingly, the history behind this phenomenon is quite complex, implicating everything 
from the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union to issues of nostalgia and public 
transportation, but scholars have ultimately concluded that these modded rides are indeed a 
kind of political statement: “The cacharro [jalopy] is a surrogate for dealing with life and the 
system imposed by the Revolution with its shortages, its patchwork solutions, and its 
unfulfilled promises.”118 Like Chinese gamers on Steam, ordinary Cubans have poached and 
modded foreign technologies in order to contend with the ideology—or rather the space—of 
the socialist state, and these phenomena also represent instances of the processes of repair 
and inventiveness, a sociopolitical dynamic shared across post-socialist contexts all around 
the globe. 
In “Rethinking Repair,” Steven J. Jackson conducts what he calls an “exercise in 
broken world thinking,” challenging media and technology studies scholars to ask “what 
happens when we take erosion, breakdown, and decay, rather than novelty, growth, and 
progress, as our starting points in thinking through the nature, use, and effects of information 
technology and new media.”119 Jackson’s exercise builds upon or rather rebuilds notions of 
breakdown, maintenance, and repair—notions which in China are anything but new. For 
Chinese users on Steam, modding is simultaneously a form of breaking and repair: Western-
centric games like L4D2 are “broken” and then repaired with culturally-specific mods, 
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hegemonic state ideologies are ruptured with politically-sensitive or subversive roguish 
discourses, and the archives and repertoire surrounding these discourses are slowly but surely 
restored after being continually “shot down” (枪毙) behind the Great Firewall. In other 
words, the reason a meme like Moha Culture or “The Elder” has survived for so long is 
precisely because it is always breaking down: its origins have to be intermittently 
rediscovered, its oblique references have to be constantly rewritten or modded, and new 
rogue archives have to be periodically reestablished on tactical safe spaces like the Steam 
Workshop. Jackson continues: 
Repair is about space and function—the extension or safeguarding of capabilities in 
danger of decay… Above all, repair occupies and constitutes an aftermath, growing at 
the margins, breakpoints, and interstices of complex sociotechnical systems as they 
creak, flex, and bend their way through time. It fills in the moment of hope and fear in 
which bridges from old worlds to new worlds are built, and the continuity of order, 
value, and meaning gets woven, one tenuous thread at a time.120 
 
What will be the aftermath of the “China Steam” swap? What will happen to the rogue 
Chinese archives and their tactical safe space on the Steam Workshop? What, in effect, will 
these modders do? The answer, perhaps, is that they will simply “make do”: they will revamp 
and rewrite; they will repair and resume; they will continue to be rogues; they will continue 
to mod. Jackson claims that in order to understand issues of breakdown, maintenance, and 
repair, their “secret history…must be made empirically and conceptually familiar, even 
normal,”121 but normal to whom?  
In his seminal 1969 manifesto, “For an Imperfect Cinema,” Cuban filmmaker Julio 
García Espinosa appeals for the material, aesthetic, and indeed ideological necessity of 
inventive forms of repair in socialist societies, posing and answering the question “What is 
considered beauty today, and where is it found? On Campbell's soup labels, in a garbage can 
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lid, in gadgets?... Imperfect cinema is no longer interested in quality or technique. It can be 
created equally well with a Mitchell or with an 8mm camera, in a studio or in a guerrilla 
camp in the middle of the jungle.”122 Espinosa further extends these issues to larger, more 
metaphysical concerns: “The traditional rejection of the body, of material life, is due in part 
to the concept that things of the spirit are more elevated, more elegant, serious and 
profound… We should understand from here on in that the body and the things of the body 
are also elegant, and that material life is beautiful as well.”123 Like imperfect cinema, 
modding is an imperfect form of artistic expression, in which modders find themselves 
working with leftover material—hypertexts which all but erase their original authors—while 
ultimately serving larger political aims. In post-socialist contexts such as China and Cuba, 
these political aims take on a particular and highly idiosyncratic nature. Ariana Hernández-
Reguant, in her chapter “The Inventor, the Machine, and the New Man,” similarly examines 
the role of “inventiveness” in the context of Cuban socialism, contending that both “the 
encouragement and admiration of inventions and the glorification of the figure of the 
inventor have been features of socialist ideology since the early twentieth century.”124 
Hernández-Reguant defines this role of invention even more clearly later in her essay: 
Inventions, in sum, were concrete forms that expressed ideological desires for better 
worlds as well as workers’ social ambitions. Whether in practice socialist inventions 
were useful or useless, they were the stepping stones of a progress that was said to be 
built, along with science, on trial and error—just as national independence was to be 
built, at least in Castro’s Cuba, by turning defeat into victory.125 
 
In other words, inventions and repair are not so much about products as they are about 
means, and by poaching these means—by inventing and reinventing outside the realm of the 
state—Chinese modders are turning the socialist ideology of the PRC upon itself. 
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 Thus the “socialist space” with which we began this essay finds itself in quite the 
predicament. In the PRC state’s relentless quest to censor, suppress, and appropriate the 
representational spaces of its critics through fear, friction, and flooding, it has ironically 
forged an equally formidable opponent—a “mouse” which has essentially become immune to 
its strategies, a bona fide “Jerry” for its Tom—much like how the actions of the overly-
oppressive and inept KMT ultimately led to support among the people for the CCP during the 
Chinese Civil War. The tactics of today’s rogues include “jamming” not only ideologies but 
technologies, modding a roguish game like L4D2 to attack the CCP’s official line, and also to 
show that even a “Great Wall” can fall. This battle-hardened inventiveness is an unintended 
but inevitable consequence of the state’s aggressive censorship strategy, leading the CCP to 
seek new alternatives and strike deals with foreign tech companies such as Valve—producing 
yet another “propaganda archive” and further augmenting their post-socialist space. Yet just 
as the villagers of rural Wenzhou in the introduction showed signs of “cunning adaptation 
and challenges to the new spatialities of the state-capital power alliance,”126 Chinese modders 
on Steam have also exhibited their own inventiveness in adapting cyberspace to their own 
aims, transforming their representational spaces into reality by modding both ideologies and 
technologies and archiving roguish discourses on a tactical safe space like the Steam 
Workshop. Even if the tactical safe space of the Workshop has been compromised, the 
representational space behind it will live on and another rogue archive will soon pop up in its 
place. In a word, for China’s rogues, it’s only a matter of time.127 
Indeed, repair and inventiveness have been the norm in China for years, from the 
repairpersons and recyclers who roll through residential complexes (小区) advertising their 
services, to the reformers in the Party who propelled the Reform and Opening Up policy and 
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its “modding” of socialism, there is nothing new about the old in China. Making do with the 
cultural dominant of the early twenty-first century,128 today’s rogues are zombies—left for 
dead only to rise again. 
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